




University of Aberdeen 




Centre of Energy Law 









Measuring Public Participation in International Investment Treaty 













Chapter 16.  Measuring Public Participation in International Investment Treaty Law: A 
Study of the Latin American Extractive Industries.  
 
Gloria M Alvarez and Ilias Kazeem  
[A] Introduction  
 
One of the most severe criticisms received in the legal world has been directed to the 
existence of the dispute settlement mechanism of investor-state arbitration (ISDS). The 
Financial Times has referred to the ISDS process to be ‘unsuited to meet global challenges’.1 
Criticisms to the system should not come as a surprise as these are not exclusive of the ISDS 
process.2 That said, despite the ordinariness of some of the criticisms, the transformation of 
the ISDS process is a worthwhile task to pursue in order to achieve a more transparent, 
consistent and cost-effective arbitration process. To this endeavour, the ongoing work of the 
‘ISDS reform’ is currently tackling most of the ISDS pervasive issues.3  
 
Nonetheless, a problem that remains unaddressed by the current ISDS reform, is the role of 
public and indigenous communities in investment projects. This paper uses the momentum 
gained by the current ISDS transformative era, to draw attention to this also very important 
issue and set the agenda on the beginning of a paradigm inclusive of communities’ rights in 
international investment law.  
 
So far, the problem has been that the ISDS process has been narrowly constructed in a way 
limited to a two-way relationship between investor and state. This paper proposes that the 
time has come to adopt a bigger dimension where public participation is a also recognised 
stakeholder in the ISDS process. The benefit is that our attention would be placed at 
recognising the importance of endemic socio-economic global issues, where the law can 
foster a better dialogue in achieving domestic, regional and international social justice.4 This 
concern has been already recognised in the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), where the value of public participation has been identified as an intrinsic element of 






1 Kavaljit Singh, ISDS is unsuited to meet today’s global challenges, https://www.ft.com/content/ed08cd0c-2fea-11e7-9555-
23ef563ecf9a (accessed 21 Aug. 2020) and BBC Sounds, Company vs Country,  
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/b05ntj7p (accessed 21 Aug. 2020). 
2 See for example the criticisms to the WTO in  Hunter Nottage, Evaluating the criticism that WTO retaliation rules 
undermine the utility of WTO dispute settlement for developing countries, in Chad Bown and Joost Pauwelyn (eds), The law, 
economics and politics of retaliation in WTO dispute settlement, 320 (Cambridge University Press 2010); Steve Chanovitz, 
Transparency and participation in the World Trade Organization, 56 Rutgers L. Rev. 927 (2004); Gabrielle Marceau and 
Mikella Hurley, Transparency and public participation in the WTO: A report card on WTO transparency mechanisms, 4(1) 
Trade L. & Dev. 19 (2012) and Robert E. Hudec, The new WTO dispute settlement procedure: An overview of the first three 
years, 8 Minn J. Global Trade 1 (1999). 
3 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group III, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, 
https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state (accessed 23 Jul. 2020). 
4 See for example, United Nations, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf (accessed 18 Jun. 2020); and  Zero 
draft of a legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, 




[1] Proposition and Main Objective  
 
The Chapter surveys a series of community actions taken to defend and protect collective 
rights during the performance of an investment project. These community actions are 
measured employing certain elements of the social tool known as the Arnstein’s ladder, in 
order to understand the effectiveness of power exchange between local communities and 
foreign investors. In addition, the Chapter evaluates the weight given by arbitration tribunals 
to the allegations suffered by the communities involved in the investment project. The 
analysis pins down the effects of a lack of formal normative recognition in investment treaties 
and the inconsistencies between domestic and international investment laws. Lastly, the 
Chapter identifies the ISDS capability to enforce community rights and the absence of legal 
relief to those affected communities.  
 
Therefore, the proposition in this paper is to create a more inclusive decision-making process, 
in order to have a more socially just ISDS process which can foster its own democratic 
legitimation.5  As a matter of fact, it is worth noting that the role of public participation is 
precisely aligned with SDG 5.5, which integrates vulnerable groups into decision-making 
processes in order to facilitate informed investment decision-making while strengthening the 
bridge between the law, business and society.6 
 
In navigating the issue of communities’ participation, the Chapter questions the extent to 
which investment treaty law is a socially just adjudication process. To examine this 
proposition, the Chapter undertakes an empirical scrutiny of publicly available arbitration 
cases to identify the role of public participation rights exercised when a local community has 
had interests vested in an investment project. 
 
Therefore, one of the main objectives of this paper is to bring clarity to the intersections 
between community engagement and international investment law in the particular context of 
energy and natural resources disputes. The Chapter advocates that community rights should 
be recognised, protected and become part of a formal normative recognition in international 
investment treaties. So far, as the analysis in this Chapter reveals, arbitration tribunals tend to 
overlook participatory rights of local communities, with more prominent violations when 
indigenous communities are involved. In response, the Chapter zooms into investment 
arbitration cases in Latin America, home of 42 million indigenous people. According to 
ICSID Statistics, 51% of disputes registered are in the energy and natural resources sector 
and Latin America has hosted 33% of all the investment treaty cases under the ICSID 
Convention.7  
 
The discussion presented in this paper is timely and relevant as it identifies with clarity the 
social problem arising from international investment law in the context of communities’ 
rights. It also provides for a way to classify the current manifestations of community 
engagement in the aim of contributing to a more formalized discussion advocating for these 
 
5 Daria Shapovalova, Indigenous Rights and Resources Extraction in Guyana: A Learning Opportunity for the New Offshore 
Sector, 2 OGEL Journal, 1, 3 (2020) and Holder J and Lee M, Environmental Protection, Law and Policy: Text and 
Materials, 85 - 185 (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press 2007). 
6  UN Sustainable Development Goals, Information for Integrated Decision-Making & Participation,  https://su 
stainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/information-integrated-decision-making-and-participation (accessed 17 Jun. 2020). 
7ICSID, The ICSID Caseload Statistics Issue 2020-2, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/publications/The%20ICSID%20Caseload%20Statistics%20%282020-
2%20Edition%29%20ENG.pdf (accessed 21 Aug. 2020).  
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rights to be explicitly included in investment laws. This is of particular relevance in 
developing economies including Latin America, a region which already has been the 
epicentre of distrust to investment treaty arbitration as it has been perceived as a dispute 
resolution mechanism eliding community values and democratic concerns.8 In addition, there 
is already evidence of the political, historical and social tensions between the public and the 
government due to the imbalances between protecting local communities and the protections 
granted to foreign investments.9  
 
[2] Methodology, Arnstein’s ladder and Social License to Operate  
 
In this paper, the proposal is to collect the available empirical data, mainly from the 
investment treaty practice in the energy and natural resources sector in Latin America. This 
data will set out the different scenarios where an investment project appears to have had an 
effect in the respective local communities. The paper will then proceed to classify the 
different ways in which the public and communities’ concerns have interacted during the 
performance of the investment project and how this evidence has been taken into account by 
arbitration tribunals.  
 
The innovative approach this paper offers is the use of Arnstein’s ladder as the methodology 
to define and classify the different examples of community and public participation in 
investment treaty practice.10 In social and environmental sciences, Arnstein’s ladder has been 
already used to measure the exchange of power between the community as right holders -but 
often the less economically advantaged- and foreign investors as power holders.  
 
Using Arnstein’s ladder in this paper adds clarity to the discussion, given that previous 
theoretical constructs that systematize third party rights in investment arbitration do not exist. 
More concretely, in this paper, Arnstein’s ladder will be used to classify the different types of 
public and communities’ actions into different levels of participation and engagement in the 
planning and execution of investment projects. Arnstein’s classification measures the level of 
power exercised by the public and communities and argues that there are seven degrees 
measuring the power of decision making. These levels are: (1) manipulation, (2) therapy, (3) 








8 Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 36 Journal of American Planning Association, 216, 217 (1969), 
David Schneiderman, Investing in Democracy? Political Process and International Investment Law, 60 University of 
Toronto Law Journal (2010); Corporate Europe, Suing to force through a toxic goldmine: Gabriel Resources v Romania, 
https://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/Gabriel%20Resources%20vs%20Romania.pdf (accessed 10 Jun. 202); 
Tania Voon and Andrew D. Mitchell, Denunciation, Termination and Survival: The Interplay of Treaty Law and 
International Investment Law, 31(2) ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 413 -433 (2016) and Catharine Titi, 
Investment Arbitration in Latin America: The Uncertain Veracity of Preconceived Ideas, 30(2) Arbitration International, 
357-386 (2014). 
9 World Bank, Indigenous Latin America in the Twenty-First Century, 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/lac/brief/indigenous-latin-america-in-the-twenty-first-century-brief-report-page 
(accessed 23 Jun. 2020).  
10 Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 36 Journal of American Planning Association, 216, 217 (1969). 
11 Which means making someone less angry or annoyed in Cambridge Dictionary, Placate, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/placate (accessed 24 Jun. 2020). 
















[i] Arnstein’s Ladder in International Investment Law 
 
In interpreting Arnstein’s ladder into investment treaty practice, it is important to understand 
that each step of the ladder increases the community involvement and the power control 
retained over the investment project.  
 
Manipulation and Therapy  
 
Manipulation and therapy are the most basic levels of public and community participation, 
which enable the community to somehow participate in the planning of the government’s 
program. Manipulation and therapy occur where the government and the investor can have 
the opportunity to educate the community on the project, but without giving away any level 
of power in the decision-making.  
 
Information and Consultation  
 
The second two levels are informing and consultation, where there is a reciprocal exercise 




Placation refers to actions, where the economically disadvantaged give advice on the 
potential impact of the investment project but the investor continues to retain decision-
making powers. Moving forward into the ladder, the next level of participation, according to 
Arnstein, is partnership, which permits communities to ‘negotiate and engage in trade-offs’.14  
 
Delegated Power and Citizen Control  
 
Lastly, delegated power and citizen control are based on a horizontal level of power and 
control between on the one hand the communities, and on the other hand the government and 
the foreign investor. An example of delegated power and citizen control is where the 
community obtains some of the managerial or decision-making control during the life of the 
project. An additional characteristic to these two last levels of participation (delegated power 
 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid.  
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and citizen control) is the form in which communities could retain and sustain control, either 
by banning or prohibiting the project using a veto power.15  
 
[ii] Social License to Operate  
 
In addition, in order to further advance in the social aspect of this debate, the present analysis 
will be enhanced by looking into the concept of ‘Social License to Operate (SLO)’. SLO is a 
notion which has emerged in social and environmental sciences and it is often used to 
encapsulate a set of participatory, social and environmental rights and obligations between 
the investor and the society involved in an energy or natural resources project.  
 
The SLO idea is that in addition to the legal license given by a government to an investor, the 
investor also needs to obtain -and maintain- a license to operate from the local community. In 
other words, SLO crystallises a reiterative process on a project’s ongoing approval by 
community stakeholders.16 SLO should be understood differently than an environmental 
permit; SLO’s scope is broader as it includes key characteristics of procedural justice, access 
to information, public participation (i.e. Aarhus Convention,17 Escazu Convention18 and ILO 
16919),  transparency and early involvement of the public.20 In addition, local communities 
can use SLO to scrutinize how companies obtain land access to undertake commercial 
activities.21 Given that this is an emergent concept in social sciences; legal literature have 
acknowledged the difficulty in universally defining the characteristics of  SLO.22  
 
SLO is not exclusively associated with extractive industries, albeit most of the literature 
currently emanates from this industry.23 The power sector already offers examples on how 
 
15 Bodil Damgaard and Jenny M. Lewis, Accountability and Citizen Participation, in Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin and 
Thomas Schillemans (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability (OUP 2014). 
16 Mihaela-Maria Barnes, The ‘Social License to Operate’: An emerging concept in the practice of international investment 
tribunals, 10 J.I.D.S., 328 - 360 (2019). 
17 UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (1998),  https://www.unece.org/env/pp/introduction.html (accessed 22 Jun. 2020). 
18 The Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean (2018), 
https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/43583/1/S1800428_en.pdf (accessed 3 Dec. 2020).   
19 The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, No. 169 (1989), 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C169 (accessed 3 Dec. 
2020).  
20 European Commission, 2013a. Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, 
amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 
78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC Text with EEA relevance’ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal 
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0034 (accessed 9 Jul. 2020). 
21 Raphael J. Heffron, Lauren Downes, Oscar M. Ramirez Rodriguez, Darren McCauley, The emergence of the ‘social 
licence to operate’ in the extractive industries?, Resources Policy Resources Policy (2018).  
22 The analysis relies on the works of: David Bursey, Rethinking Social Licence to Operate – A concept in search of 
Definition and Boundaries, 7 Business Council of British Columbia 5 – 6 (2015); Jason Prno and D Scott Slocombe, 
Exploring the origins of “Social Licence to Operate” in the mining sector: Perspectives from governance and sustainability 
theories 37 Resources Policy 346, 350 – 354 (2012); among others and Heffron, supra n. 21. 
23 Airong Zhang and Kieren Moffat, A balancing act: The role of benefits, impacts and confidence in governance in 
predicting acceptance of mining in Australia, 44 Resources Policy, 25 - 34 (2012); Owen, J.R., Kemp, D., Social licence and 
mining: a critical perspective, 38 Resource Policy, 29–35 (2013); Anni Huhtala and Piia Remes, Quantifying the social costs 
of nuclear energy: Perceived risk of accident at nuclear power plants, 105 Energy Policy 320 – 331 (2017) and John 
Whitton, Kathryn Brasier, Ioan Charnley-Parry and Mattew Cotton, Shale gas governance in the United Kingdom and the 
United States: Opportunities for public participation and the implications for social justice, 26 Energy Research & Social 
Science 11 – 22 (2017). 
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SLO has applications across other energy and natural resources industries.24 For example, in 
Peru, a major electricity transmission infrastructure project Electrica Moyombaba-Iquitos lost 
the legal permit for the project as it failed to maintain a stable relationship with the local 
community due the lack of a consultation process with the relevant indigenous 
communities.25  
 
There are, however, some disadvantages of the SLO. Notably, SLO is an informal concept 
not recognised in domestic or international legislation, which makes SLO difficult to be taken 
into account as part of the legal requirements of an investment process. Nonetheless, SLO 
represents an opportunity to formalise and insert binding obligations to investors and 
governments, which ensures that community rights are not only heard but also respected 
during the operation of a private project.26 In addition, differently to FPIC, SLO’s scope 
could function to use some of the principles on Arnsteins’s ladder to create systems of control 
between rights and power holders. For example, it could impose as a requirement to the 
project the adoption of an impact-benefit agreement not only for indigenous communities but 
for the entirety of vulnerable communities affected by an investment project.  
 
[B] Setting the Scene  
 
The National Park Yiagoje Apaporis is the home of the Macuna, Tanimuka, Letuama, 
Cabiyari, Barazano, Yujup Maku and Yauna communities; all of these are a set of diverse 
indigenous settlements in the Colombian Amazon. The Colombian national government 
reports that an estimated 1,600 inhabitants are living in the area along with protected fauna, 
sacred territories and significant gold deposits, the latter with an estimated value of at least 
USD16.5 billion.27 In the last twenty years, foreign mining companies have sought to apply 
for licensing rights, a process which has instigated tensions at various indigenous groups in 
the region.28 Alleged inconsistencies in the consultation processes with the indigenous 
communities have caused delays and cancellations in mining concessions. Foreign investors 
have claimed loss in their investments blaming the Colombian government failure to conduct 
prior consent consultations in accordance with domestic laws.29  
 
At a different latitude, Las Víboras, an urban municipality located in the North of Mexico, 
was the epicentre of a series of local community protests against Cytar, a company owned by 
Tecmed (USA), a waste-management corporation specialized in hazardous industrial waste. 
During the first years of the investment, evidence of uncontained waste lying exposed caused 
community opposition, and eventually became a tool of political pressure from the 
community to the government authorities. Local communities’ protests, including rallies and 
 
24 Heffron, supra n. 21. See for example, Tor Håkon Jackson Inderberg, Helga Rognstad,Inger-Lise Saglie and Lars H. 
Gulbrandsen, Who influences wind power licensing decisions in Norway? Formal requirements and informal practices, 52 
Energy Research & Social Science, 181 - 191 (2019). 
25 Mala Sentencia: Proyecto Linea de Transmision Electrica Electrica Moyombaba-Iquitos, https://idl.org.pe/mala-sentencia-
proyecto-linea-de-transmision-electrica-moyobamba-iquitos/ (accessed 8 Jul. 2020). 
26 Hefron, supra n. 21. 
27 Gobierno de Colombia, Parque Nacional Natural Yaigojé Apaporis, http://www.parquesnacionales.gov.co/portal/es/parqu
es-nacionales/parque-nacional-natural-yaigoje-apaporis/ (accessed 16 Jun. 2020).  
28 Cosigo Resources & Tobie Mining Corp v Colombia, UNCITRAL, Notice of Intent to Arbitrate, paras 7-8 (5 August 
2015); Ioana Florea and Hannibal Rhoades, Possibilities and pitfalls of environmental justice action, in Elia Apostolopoulou 
and Jose Cortes-Vazquez (eds), The Right to Nature: Social Movements, Environmental Justice and Neaoliberal Rules, Ch. 6 
(1st ed., Routledge 2019); Enrique Prieto-Rios and Daniel Rivaz-Ramirez, Neocolonialism and the Tension between 
International Investment Law and Indigenous Peoples: The Latin American Experience, in John Borrows and Risa Schwartz 
(eds), Indigenous Peoples and International Trade: Building Equitable and Inclusive International Trade and Investment 
Agreements (Cambridge University Press 2020). 
29 Cosigo, supra n. 28, paras 12-22. 
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marches, underscored the sentiment towards Cytar’s activities as a real or potential threat to 
health and the environment. Las Víboras citizens’ pressure forced the government to refuse 
Cytar’s license renewal. In response, Tecmed initiated investment treaty arbitration against 
Mexico.30 In its reasoning, the tribunal concluded that the economic impact caused to 
Tecmed was more severe than the apparent potential dangers that could have been caused by 
hazardous waste.31  
 
Apaporis and Las Víboras are just two of the many real-life examples elucidating the 
secondary, yet fundamental, role of the local communities in the life of foreign investments. 
The binarity of the investor-state relationship makes limited room to accommodate the 
concerns of community rights. Consequently, lack of attention to community rights are 
ignored throughout the whole life of an investment; including pre-investment and post-






Policy developments and imbalances  
 
At policy and treaty level, there are already novel developments where the notion of 
participatory rights is being considered.32 For example, the Canada-EU Free Trade 
Agreement explicitly refers to promoting transparency in the form of public awareness, 
availability of information and participation of the civil society (Article 24.9). The 
Netherlands Model Investment Agreement includes express reference to fundamental 
instruments on social justice (i.e. ILO Conventions) and refers to the investors to conduct 
investment panels (before and during the investment), improved forms of impact assessments 
and transparency initiatives (Article 7.3). In addition, policy discussions such as the one 
driven at the UNCITRAL Working Group III (ISDS reform), have voiced out the importance 
of creating sound investment frameworks which harness economic development in a way that 
protects the environment and is inclusive of the interests of civil society.33  
 
There is, however, plenty to do in terms of developing a common conceptual approach to 
formalise community interventions in international investment treaty law. So far, community 
interventions can take the form of legal rights, including public consultations and other types 
of forms where due process consultations are attached to power retention by the local 
communities in investment projects (i.e. the right to veto). Today, participatory rights in 
international investment law are understood in a shattered fashion, where the same legal 
notions are often used to refer to different actions on community engagement. So far, 
contemporary treatises refer to third parties participation without any systematic 
understanding, as a matter of fact, some refer to amicus curiae participations as the extent to 
 
30 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v The United Mexican States (Tecmed v Mexico), ICSID Case No.ARB 
(AF)/00/2, Award (29 May 2003). 
31 Ibid, para. 144. 
32 See for example, the Canada-EU Free Trade Agreement (CETA), art. 24 and the Netherlands Model Investment 
Agreement (Dutch Model BIT), https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2018D51015&did=2018D51015 
(accessed 22 Jun. 2020). 
33 A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.160, UNCITRAL Working Group III, Summary of the intersessional regional meeting on investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS) reform submitted by the Government of the Dominican Republic, 
https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.160 (accessed 22 Jun. 2020).  
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which third party rights are represented in investment treaty law.34 More advanced literature 
refers with more detail to  landowner,35 indigenous people36 and human rights.37 The problem 
is, however, that all of these notions are either procedurally or substantively different, and 
should not be seen as a universal way of formalising all participatory rights in international 
investment law.  
 
Moreover, none of the current normative formulations fully facilitates ‘responsive, inclusive, 
participatory and representative decision-making’ processes (SDG 16.7). Landowner, 
community rights or indigenous rights, for example, are not included into the majority of the 
normative realm of international investment treaties.38 Third parties rights can be many, and 
the argument could be made that international investment law is not the place to define, enlist 
and protect all the legal rights available to the communities affected by foreign investments.  
 
However, these findings indicate that more research needs to be done regarding the 
imbalances between international and national laws on the protection of community rights in 
the light of investment promotion. In this context, current criticisms seem to target 
international investment law, without addressing the fact that the work needs to start at 
national level. Therefore, there should be a more systemic understanding and classification on 
the different types of community engagement interplaying in investment arbitration; this 
classification can serve as a starting point to advance further the debate on a formal inclusion 
of participatory and communities rights in investment treaties. 
 
In the context of Latin America, the region is a global economic key player in energy, natural 
resources and other environmental related investments and it is expected to continue hosting 
new large-scale projects.39 Latin America holds some of the world’s largest oil and gas 
reserves,40 while Brazil, Chile and Mexico are ranked amongst the top ten global renewable 
energy markets.41 In the extractive industries, Peru and Brazil are in the top ten countries for 
 
34 Gary Born and Stephanie Forrest, Amicus Curiae Participation in Investment Arbitration, 34(3) ICSID Rev. - Foreign 
Inv. L. J., 625 - 665 (2019); Lance Bartholomeusz, The Amicus Curiae before international courts and tribunals, 5(2) 
N.S.I.A.L., 209 (2005); Alexis Mourre, Are Amicus Curia the proper response to the public’s concerns on transparency in 
investment arbitration, 5(2) Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 257 (2006); Eugenia Levine, Amicus 
Curiae in international investment arbitration: The implications of an increase in third-party participation 29(1) Berk. J. 
Intl Law, 200 (2011); Filip Balcerzak, Amicus Curiae submissions in investor-state arbitrations, 12 Common Law Review 
66 (2012); and Denis Parchajev and Rimantas Daujotas, Can Amici Curiae rescue the fading EU ISDS system, 1(1) European 
Investment Law and Arbitration Review 115 (2016). 
35  Lorenzo Cotula and Nicolas M Perrone, Reforming investor-state dispute settlement: what about third-party rights?, 
IIED Briefing Papers, Durham University (February 2019) https://pubs.iied.org/17638IIED/?a=lorenzo+cotula (accessed 21 
Aug. 2020) and Lorenzo Cotula and Mika Schröder, Community perspectives in investor-state arbitration, IIED Land, 
Investment and Rights Series (2017) https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/12603IIED.pdf (accessed 21 Aug. 2020). 
36 Valentina Vadi, When Cultures Collide: Foreign Direct Investment, Natural Resources and Indigenous Heritage in 
International Investment Law, 42 Col. Hum. R. L. Rev., 797 - 889 (2011). See also George K Foster, Foreign investment and 
indigenous peoples: Options for promoting equilibrium between economic development and indigenous rights, 33(4) Mich. 
J. Intl L., 627 (2012). 
37 Fabio Giuseppe Santa, The applicability of human rights law in international investment disputes, 34(1) ICSID Review 
136 – 155 (2019).  
38 UN Sustainable Development Goals, Information for Integrated Decision-Making & Participation, https://su 
stainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/information-integrated-decision-making-and-participation (accessed 17 Jun. 2020). 
39 Shapovalova, supra n. 5. 
40 Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/961596/latin-america-crude-oil-reserves-country/ (accessed 26 Aug. 2020). 
See also Aljazeera, Latin America holds one fifth of world’s oil, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/07/201171613719358164.html (accessed 26 Aug. 2020).  
41 International Renewable Energy Agency, Renewable Energy Market Analysis: Latin America, 
https://www.irena.org/publications/2016/Nov/Renewable-Energy-Market-Analysis-Latin-America (accessed 24 Jun. 2020) 
and Lisa Viscidi and Rebecca O’Connor, The Dialogue, US-Latin America Energy Investment: Proposals for Policy 
Engagement, http://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/US-Latin-America-Energy-Investment_FINAL-for-
web.pdf (accessed 24 Jun. 2020). 
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gold mine reserves. In addition, the transformation of energy systems in line with the energy 
transition requirements will pave the way to more innovation, technology and investments, 
including in the hydrogen sector.42  
 
The data obtained in this paper is of the highest importance for the socio-economic success of 
energy investments in Latin America; it addresses the potential tensions arising from energy 
investments with the local communities. These tensions can put at risk the well-being of local 
communities and cause irreversible social, economic or environmental damage. This is the 
example of many of the current investment arbitration cases, which come from the extractive 
industries,43 where exploitation and disposition of resources have been affected by the 
resource curse paradox.44 The resource curse paradox describes the phenomenon where 
natural resources and sovereignty belong to the people, while the actual control is legally 
vested in the governments.45 The real problem is that, despite abundance of natural or mineral 
resources, the resource curse theory propounds that the resource-rich countries tend to lack 
economic growth, partially due to the lack of clear laws regarding the management and 
control of foreign investments, which can aggravate the tension between foreign investors 
and the local communities.46  
 
[C] The Notion and Limitations of Public Participation in International Law 
 
Environmental studies have explained that rather than one single persuasive argument to 
advocate for the inclusion of public participation in the law, different elements should be 
considered in a cumulative manner.47 This is reflected in international environmental law, 
where the notion of public participation must have three essential elements: access to 
information, public participation in environmental decision making and access to judicial 
remedies.48  
 
Today, the best normative example of environmental democracy in international law is the 
Aarhus Convention,49 which aims to guarantee the right to access to information, public 
participation and access to justice in environmental matters (Article 1). The baseline of the 
Aarhus Convention is that public participation contributes to ‘more environmentally benign 
decisions’.50 In addition, the Convention links public participation with individual and human 
rights in order to collectively protect the environment by actively exercising environmental 
citizenship at participating in the public debate on private decisions.51 The three pillars of 
access to information, public participation and access to justice have now also been adopted 
in the Escazu Convention, with specific focus of application on Latin America and the 
 
42 Energy Advisor: A publication of the dialogue: Does hydrogen fuel have a bright future in Latin America,  
https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/does-hydrogen-fuel-have-a-bright-future-in-latin-america/ (accessed 7 Jul. 2020)  
43 See for example, the cases of Beer Creek v Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21; South American Silver Limited v Bolivia, 
PCA Case No. 2013-15; Copper Mesa Mining Corporation v Ecuador (PCA Case No. 2012-2) and Gabriel Resources Ltd v 
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/31. 
44  On resource curse, see Jorge E Vinuales, The resource curse: A legal perspective 17 Global Governance, 197-212 (2011). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Holder J and Lee M, Environmental Protection, Law and Policy: Text and Materials, 97 (2nd ed., Cambridge University 
Press 2007). 
48 Ibid, at 86. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992) (Rio Declaration)  prin 10, 
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_CONF.151_26_Vol.
I_Declaration.pdf (accessed 3 Dec. 2020). 
49 UNECE, Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (1998),  https://www.unece.org/env/pp/introduction.html (accessed 22 Jun. 2020). 
50 Holder and Lee, supra n. 47, at 99. 
51 Ibid. 
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Carribean.52 However, the Escazu Convention is yet to enter into force, as it requires 
ratification by at least 11 states (Article 22), out of which 9 states have ratified thus far.53 It 
has been observed that both of the Aarhus and Escazu Conventions show regional approach 
to the application of the global standards on public participation, as stipulated in the principle 
10 of the Rio Declaration.54 Meanwhile, the Escazu Convention better enhances the standards 
of public participation, compared to the Aarhus Convention, with respect to its innovative 
provisions on the protection of vulnerable groups (Articles 4.5, 5.3 and 5.4), the protection of 
the defenders of human rights on environmental matters (Article 9) and capacity building 
(Article 10).55 The Escazu Convention therefore seeks to address the unique challenges 
facing the region of Latin America and the Carribean on the aforesaid issues.56   
 
There are additional international instruments which consider participatory rights either in the 
context of hazardous waste (1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal57) or environmental impact assessments 
and transboundary issues (i.e. the 1991 UNECE Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context58 and 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes).59  
 
In the context of minority rights (i.e. indigenous groups), there are a number of relevant 
international frameworks such as the International Labour Organization 169 (ILO 169),60 the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)61 and, regionally, in Latin 
America, the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (ADRIP). Unlike 
the Aarhus Convention, one of the relevant characteristics of the ILO 169 is that it has been 
ratified by Latin American countries home of many indigenous groups; including Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.62 
 
 
52 The Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean (2018), 
https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/43583/1/S1800428_en.pdf (accessed 3 Dec. 2020). 
53 United Nations Treaty Collection,  https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
18&chapter=27&clang=_en (accessed 1 Dec. 2020).  
54 Stephen Stec and Jerzy Jendroska, The Escazu Agreement and the regional approach to Rio Principle 10: process, 
innovation, and shortcomings, 31 Journal of Environmental Law 533 - 545 (2019). See also Emily Barritt, Global Values, 
Transnational Expression: From Aarhus to Escazu, Dickson Poon Transnational Law Institute, King’s College Research 
Paper Series 2 - 10 (2019).    
55 Sidney Guerra, Implementing Principle 10 of the 1992 RIO Declaration: a comparative study of the Aarhus Convention 
1998 and the Escazu Agreement 2018, 2(55) Curitiba 1 - 33 (2019). 
56 Lalanath De Silva, Escazu Agreement 2018: a landmark for the LAC region, 2 Chinese Journal of Environmental Law 93 
- 98 at 97 (2018). 
57 UN Environment Programme, Basel Convention,  http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/Overview/tabid/1271/Default.aspx 
(accessed 25 Jun. 2020).  
58 UN Economic Commission for Europe, EIA Convention,   http://www.unece.org/fileadmin//DAM/env/eia/welcome.html 
(accessed 25 Jun. 2020).  
59  UN Economic Commission for Europe, Water Convention, https://www.unece.org/env/water.html (accessed 25 Jun. 
2020). 
60 International Labour Organization, C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C169#A43 (accessed 25 Jun. 
2020). 
61 UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2 Oct. 2007) A/RES/61/295, 
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-
crimes/Doc.18_declaration%20rights%20indigenous%20peoples.pdf (accessed 25 Jun. 2020).  
62 ILO 169, Ratifications, 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314 (accessed on 
25 Jun. 2020). 
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ILO and UNDRIP recognise prior and informed consent as a specific right that pertains to 
indigenous people.63 However, this right does not produce a straight forward opportunity to 
give or withhold consent to a project which might affect their land. Free means that this 
consent needs to be given without any type of coercion or manipulation. Prior means that 
consent should be timely sought to allow making a decision before the authorization or 
commencement of the investment project. Informed is that the participation engagement 
includes access to the information necessary to the decision-making process. Lastly, consent 
means that there is a collective decision made by the right holders.64   
 
The problem is, however, that forms of prior or informed consent are also limited in scope as 
it exclusively aims to guarantee participatory rights to  indigenous communities as land 
owners.65 FPIC does not contemplate mechanisms to ensure that right owners can exercise or 
retain power as a guarantee that their rights will continue to be protected during the life of the 
investment. Therefore, delegation of power or citizens control is not part of FPIC. Secondly, 
in some Latin American regions, indigenous communities often cohabitate with the rest of a 
vulnerable community. The community is vulnerable either because there is limited access to 
public health, labour opportunities or infrastructure (roads, schools, etc). There are many 
local communities in Latin America in this situation where there are no clear divisions 
between one population or the other, and collectively they become the local vulnerable 
community hosting an investment project. Therefore, even if FPIC would be incorporated in 
its current form into international investment laws, FPIC’s outreach and exchange would be 
limited in terms of content and subjects (i.e. without no power exchange as guarantee to 
protect all types of right holders). 
[D] Community Participation in International Investment Treaty Law and Practice  
 
[1] Limitations on Power Exchange due Absence of Normative Safeguards  
 
The analysis of the investment treaty law and its practice has identified some of the crucial 
failures when integrating communities’ rights into the ISDS system. The first set of cases 
analysed seem to indicate that the absence of normative safeguards provokes limitations on 
power exchange between the right holders and the power holders; meaning the community 
and investor respectively.  For example, a one-way communication system indicates that 
while the community was able to express their concerns, there is evidence that either the state 
or the investor failed at following through to mitigate their concerns. The analysis reveals that 
this is attributed to the lack of normative instruments which does not acknowledge and 
protect the community’s priorities.  
 
The first example chosen to analyse citizen’s power and public participation is Tecmed v 
Mexico,66 a case which shows how the government’s conduct relegated community 
participation to a one-way flow information exercise. The investment project involved a 
controlled landfill of hazardous waste located close to an urban centre, a project which was 
 
63 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Free, Prior and Informed Consent, 
http://www.fao.org/indigenous-peoples/our-pillars/fpic/en/ (accessed 8 Jul. 2020). 
64 Mauro Barelli, Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in the UNDRIP Articles 10, 19, 29 (2), and 32(2) in Jessie Hohmann 
and Marc Weller (eds), The UN Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples: A commentary, 250 - 253 (OUP 2018). 
65 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FPIC: An Indigenous Peoples Rights and a Good Practice for 
Local Communities, http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6190e.pdf (accessed 8 Jul. 2020).  
66 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/002, Award (29 May 
2003). 
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opposed by public protests. The decision of the government to embark on the project had 
been opposed at the community level at the earliest stage of the investment but opposition 
was ignored. The community members particularly opposed the Government’s approach of 
transferring hazardous wastes of another region into the landfill. The government 
subsequently granted to Tecmed the necessary permits. However, public opposition became 
more serious and the Government decided to close down the project, without due regard to an 
agreement to relocate and continue with the project. The tribunal found that the operations 
did not cause public opposition, instead the Tribunal concluded that the real cause of the 
public protests was government’s failure to address concerns which occurred before the 
concession was awarded.67 Tecmed v Mexico falls into the Arnstein’s ladder informing rung, 
where it seems that there was only a one-way flow of information at the particular moment 
when local communities raised concerns and protested. The community did not have any 
opportunity to exchange feedback or to influence the waste-management programme and 
without any follow through action. 
 
In Gold Reserve v Venezuela, from the beginning of the project, the Ministry of Environment 
had grave concerns, due to the fact that the project was located in an ecologically and 
culturally sensitive area. The concerns were related to water resources management, 
biodiversity protection and the socio-economic impact on the indigenous communities.68 
Venezuela eventually decided to revoke an environmental permit to the construction project 
and then declined to renew the investor’s concessions.69 Venezuela argued that the revocation 
order was lawful because it was founded upon the Ministry’s authority to revoke annual 
permits, which are contrary to Venezuela’s constitutional obligation to protect the 
environment, promote a sustainable development and protect the rights of indigenous 
people.70  
 
The Revocation Order declared that ‘the mining activities in Bolivar State had altered the 
environment…affected the nearby populations, indigenous communities…serious 
environmental deterioration of the rivers, soil, flora, fauna and biodiversity in general, caused 
by the uncontrolled mining activities performed by the large number of miners present in the 
area’.71 In the award, the Tribunal acknowledged that a State has responsibility to preserve 
the environment and protect local populations living in the area where mining activities are 
conducted. However, this responsibility does not exempt a State from complying with its 
commitments to international investors by searching ways and means to satisfy both 
conditions in a balanced way.72   
 
According to Arnstein’s approach, it can be seen that citizens had some level of influence on 
the environmental and social impact assessments of the investments. However, power 
exchange took place only between the State and the investor, where community’s 
participatory rights (i.e. consultation process) seems to have taken a secondary role when 
planning the investment. The classification of Gold Reserve v Venezuela could be placed 
between consultation and placation, simply because at the moment of taking the decision to 
start the investments, the conditions did not ensure that the views of the local communities 
would be heard. As mentioned, power retention was only between the State and the investor, 
 
67 Ibid at paras 131 and 136. 
68 Gold Reserve Inc v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09, Award, para. 333 (22 Sept. 2014). 
69 Ibid at para. 341. 
70 Ibid at para. 318. 
71 Ibid at para. 594. 
72 Ibid at para. 595. 
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where there was no opportunity to articulate communities’ priorities and the extent to which 
the community had the opportunity to push for those. 
  
In Quiborax v Bolivia, the investment project was located in Salar de Uyuni (the world 
largest Salt Lake). As part of the Quirobax mining concession project, the Ministry of 
Sustainable Development granted an environmental license, which triggered civil unrest, 
including strikes and road blockades.73 The argument was, according to the media, that 
foreign investors were looting the resources and the State did nothing to prevent this.74  In 
response to the social unrest, the Bolivian Government suspended all activities and decided to 
revoke the environmental license and the region was declared in state of emergency.75 A 
subsequent ministerial memo confirmed that the revocation was a consequence of the social 
and  political pressure from the town of Uyuni.76 The Tribunal concluded that while there was 
no doubt that Bolivia was motivated by national interest, expropriation failed to meet the 
lawful condition, and quoted that ‘discrimination does not cease to be because it is 
undertaken to achieve a laudable goal’.77 According to the Arnsteins’ ladder, placation is on 
the higher side of the spectrum given that the citizens were not completely powerless as they 
were able to press for their vested interest, which triggered Bolivian government’s response 
in revoking the environmental license.  
 
While Glamis Gold v USA is a case that took place at a different latitude, it is pertinent to also 
take into account the lessons from this case to elucidate some of the tensions arising from 
public participation rights, in the context of indigenous groups in the Americas. In this case, 
the investor planned to mine gold and silver in South-eastern California, the site of the project 
was near an area protected by the California Desert Protection Act of 1994. Federal laws 
identified that the Desert in South-eastern California is a sensitive area home of 
archaeological resources, which required the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to conduct 
an impact assessment.78  
 
In addition, due to the proximity of the project to the ancestral lands, the BLM also required 
consultation with the Quechan Indian Nation as the Californian Desert local tribe. Among 
other issues, the impact assessment evidenced that the land surrounding the project was near 
cultural and ancient trails.79 The trail was part of a larger network named the Trail of Dreams, 
which was part of the Quechan Cosmology.80 BLM also determined that the project would 
affect fifty-five Native American historic properties. In response to the outcome of the impact 
assessment, the Quechuan community expressed their opposition to the mining project as it 
would put their practices in peril.81  
 
 
73 Quiborax SA and Non Metallic Minerals SA v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2. Award, paras 7, 
10–12, 17 and 19 (16 Sept. 2015); Arif Ali, Erica Franzetti, Jose Manuel Garcia Represa and Eduardo Silva Romero, Mining 
Arbitration in Latin America: Social and Environmental Issues in Investment Arbitration Cases, in Jason Fry and Louis-
Alexis Bret, Global Arbitration Review: The Guide to Mining Arbitration, 200 (Law Business Research 2019).  
74 Quiborax SA and Non Metallic Minerals SA v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, supra n. 65, at para. 250. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid at para. 252. 
77 Ibid at para. 253. 
78 Georg K. Foster, Investor - Community Conflicts in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Rethinking “Reasonable 
Expectations” and Expecting More from Investors, 69 American University Law Review 105 (2019).  
79 Ibid at 108. 
80 Ibid at 105-108. 
81 Glamis Gold, Ltd, v United States of America (Award) UNCITRAL (8 June 2009) and Glamis v. US, Counter-Memorial 
of Respondent United States of America. 
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In studying the arbitration process of this case, there is neither evidence that Glamis 
approached the Quechan Tribe seeking to establish any type of consultation process regarding 
the adverse effects of the investments, nor evidence on establishing possible economic 
compensation.82 The Quechan Tribe put additional pressure on the State of California, which 
led to the enactment of legislation prohibiting mining operations in the sacred site, unless the 
land contours of the project would be amended.83 In response, Glamis started arbitration 
proceedings against the US arguing that the new requirements would make the project 
financially infeasible and have caused illegal expropriation, both claims were rejected by the 
Tribunal.84 In its reasoning, the Tribunal was required to be mindful of how it construes the 
provisions at issue in this claim, so that the Tribunal is not endorsing conduct of the kind that 
would conflict with international norms protecting indigenous people. However, in 
dismissing Glamis’ claims, the Tribunal did not refer to any of the arguments submitted by 
the Quechan Tribe.85 
 
In Glamis Gold v USA, there are many dimensions of citizen control and participation; the 
first rung to appear according to the Arnstein’s ladder is at the end of the placation spectrum 
due to the fact that the Quechan Tribe was ignored by the investors without exploring any 
type of negotiation regarding economic compensation due to the effects of the investment. 
Nonetheless, the case displays a very good indication of trade-offs between the US 
Government and the Quechan community, where community priorities were respected and 
led to the enactment of legislation prohibiting mining operations in the area. Therefore, 
Arnstein’s delegated power rug appears in the actions led by the communities, which resulted 
in achieving a dominant control over the planning of the investment. Nonetheless, this 
example of delegated power could have had a more successful outcome if the investors would 
have responded positively to recommendations made by the BLM assessments and proceeded 
to make adjustments. Moreover, the investor should have engaged into a negotiation process 
with the Quechan community in order to find ways to protect the community’s values and 
priorities during the life of the mining project. In the alternative, the investor could have 
engaged with the community in negotiations to agree a financial compensation scheme in 
exchange for an opportunity to perform the desired investment activities.  
 
Another case, which is outside Latin America but relevant to the agenda-setting of indigenous 
communities in international investment law is Clayton v Canada. In this case, Bilcon 
(Canadian subsidiary of Clayton) was seeking to build a quarry and marine terminal in Nova 
Scotia, Canada. The Nova Scotia Government sought to attract attention from investors with 
promotional documents on the region’s potential on mining and develop a project at the 
Digby Neck area.86 Bilcon applied for approval subject to an environmental impact 
assessment according to provincial and federal laws. As part of the social and environmental 
impact assessment, a Joint Review Panel (JRP) was set up and it concluded  that the 
investment project had significant and adverse effects on community core values.87 For 
example, in the human assessment, the JRP explained that there are some aboriginal 
communities which have used Digby Neck as a hunting and harvest place, where the 
proponent (i.e. the investor) has failed at its efforts consulting the community and left 
 
82 Foster, supra n. 78, at 120.  
83 Ibid at 175.  
84 Ibid at 105.  
85 Valentina Viadi, Heritage, Power, and Destiny: The Protection of Indigenous Heritage in International Investment Law 
and Arbitration, 4 Geo. Wash. Intl L. Rev. 50 (2018).  
86 William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware v The Government of Canada 
(Clayton v Canada), PCA Case No.2009-4, Award on Damages (AD), paras 5 - 9 (10 Jan.2019). 
87 Joint Review Panel, Environmental Assessment of the Whites Point Quarry and Marine Terminal Project 109–12, 114–15 
https://iaac-aeic.gc.ca/B4777C6B-docs/WP-1837_e.pdf (accessed 15 Jul. 2020).  
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traditional knowledge outside the environmental impact assessment.88 The JRP also 
highlighted some reluctance from community members to participate in the assessment 
process due to tensions between the investor and community members regarding 
archaeological burials on the site. The JPR mentioned that the investor’s response at the 
consultation process was at times dismissive, if not openly hostile.  Moreover, the report 
mentioned that there should have been a further attempt to mitigate the rift in the society 
through the use of a more effective participation programme.89 
 
In the arbitration claim, the Arbitration Tribunal concluded that the JRP’s emphasis on 
community core values was beyond the scope of the assessment as ‘a fundamental departure 
from the methodology required by Canadian and Nova Scotia law … reliance on community 
core values was a distinct, unprecedented and unexpected approach taken by the JRP’.90 
Moreover, in the arbitration award, the Arbitral Tribunal noted that community values are not 
part of Canadian domestic laws and that these standards are unclear and open to different 
interpretations.91 A dissenting opinion was issued by one of the members of the Tribunal, 
commenting that the majority’s decision could be considered as a remarkable step backwards 
in environmental protection. The dissenting arbitrator commented that the JRP is usually 
made up of scientists and environmental experts and not necessarily lawyers and mentioned 
that:  ‘... the idea of an environmental review panel putting more weight on the human 
environment to conclude that  community values are of utmost importance for the socio-
economic success of the project should not come as a surprise…’.92 
 
In this case, there is good evidence on the participation of local communities to express and 
ensure that their priorities and concerns were respected. Similar to Glamis Gold v USA, there 
is an initial engagement of power control between the local community and the State. Power 
control is particularly reflected in the outcome of the JRP assessment, where it is mentioned 
that the investment project would endanger a set of Aboriginal community values. Arnstein’s 
delegated power rung appears to be successfully followed to the extent in which the JRP 
made the investor accountable and responsible for having failed at its efforts in conducting 
the public consultation. Nonetheless, the level of community power is limited at two different 
moments, first when the investor failed at having a more effective participation programme 
and behaved dismissively at responding to the fundamental social problems raised at the 
consultation process. Secondly, the lack of community and indigenous safeguards in NAFTA 
is reflected in the decision-making process of the arbitrators by mentioning that community 
core values are outside the methodology of the JRP assessment. This indicates, that as long as 
investment laws do not contain explicit indication on the duty to protect and respect local 
communities; tribunals will show reluctance at accommodating indigenous and communities’ 
rights. Consequently, the community's well-being will often fail to be duly considered as one 
of the essential requirements investments should follow in order to successfully obtain and 
maintain all the legal approvals to undertake an investment project.  
  
There is another set of arbitration cases leaning towards a more structured and balanced 
exercise between public participation rights, investors and state obligations. The first case 
illustrating a cohesive understanding on the vital role of community’s rights is the case of 
 
88 Ibid, at 67. 
89 Ibid, at 68-70.  
90 Clayton v Canada, supra n. 86, at para. 125. 
91 Ibid, at paras 502-547. 
92 William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware v The Government of Canada 
(Clayton v Canada), PCA Case No.2009-4, Dissenting Opinion Professor Donald McRae, paras 13,46 and 51. 
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South American Silver Limited v Bolivia.93 In this case, the Claimant alleged breach of the 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between UK and Bolivia. Claimant’s mining concessions 
were located in an area which is occupied by the locally organised Aymara and Quechua 
indigenous groups, communities which make all types of decisions in consensus. In 
preparation for the investment, South American Silver carried out 8 environmental and 
socioeconomic studies. South American Silver hired a Bolivian consultant and met with the 
communities and organised 35 workshops with the assistance of Bolivian consultants.   
 
However, in December 2010, the community decision-making group passed a resolution to 
cease mining activities on the allegation that the Claimant had contaminated the environment 
of the communities’ sacred places, abused authority, deceived and threatened community 
members.94 Events subsequently led to abduction of personnel, clashes between community 
members and local police, as well as damage to the drilling rig and blockage of the mining 
area.95 The Government consequently revoked the mining concessions on August 1, 2012. In 
the arbitration case, the Claimant sought damages for expropriation, costs and interests. The 
Claimant argued that the scope of the rights of the indigenous group is not clear under the 
international law and it cannot override the specific protections granted an investor under 
treaty provisions.96 
 
The Tribunal found that the Claimant’s failure to obtain the project’s social acceptance  was 
due to the fact of attempting to convince a partial section of the community, which led to 
problems regarding the communities’ consensus system.97 Reports also showed that the 
Claimant held meetings with some of the local groups, disregarded suggestions of collective 
meetings and offered donations to individual members of the community.98 The Tribunal 
concluded that the Claimant had shortcomings in its community relations which were not 
corrected.99 The Tribunal also found that the Respondent complied with the treaty provisions 
on expropriation including the requirement of due process, except that it failed to pay 
compensation and the Tribunal awarded 18.7 million dollars.100 
 
The dissenting opinion issued by a member of the Tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction 
and criticised the position of the majority regarding compensation and unlawful 
expropriation.101 On the other hand, a concurring opinion pointed out the shortcomings of the 
State in maintaining law and order in the communities and agreed with the conclusions of the 
presiding arbitrator.102 
 
In South American Silver Limited v Bolivia, an assessment in principle seems to indicate a 
good engagement between the investor and the indigenous communities, which gave as 
outcome evidence on public participation by means of the environmental and social studies 
carried out by the investor. Nonetheless, consultations were not used for a meaningful 
outcome. In order to avoid superficial ways of community engagement, the investor should 
 
93 South American Silver Limited v Bolivia, PCA Case No. 2013-15, Final Award (22 Nov. 2018).  
94 Ibid at paras 114 and 115. 
95 Ibid at paras 147, 157, 160 and 162. 
96 Ibid at para. 188. 
97 Ibid at para. 506. 
98 Ibid at paras 479, 480, 492 and 507. 
99 Ibid at para. 479. 
100 Ibid at para. 610. 
101 Trishna Menon, Tribunal finds expropriation of investment by Bolivia due to non-payment of compensation but awards 
only sunk costs to British Investors (Investment Treaty News, 23 Apr. 2019) https://www.iisd.org/itn/ (accessed 2 Jun. 2020). 
102 South American Silver Limited v Bolivia, PCA Case No. 2013-15, 2 (Separate opinion of Professor Francisco Orrego 
Vicuna). 
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have taken follow-up actions addressing the collective concerns from the community. 
Looking into the Arnstein’s ladder, the consultation processes carried out by South American 
Silver falls under the information rung, this is because the emphasis was placed on a one-way 
exercise.  In other words, the investor seems to have taken the consultations and studies to 
only obtain benefits and reacted by reaching out to fragmented sections of the community, 
dismissing the fact that the Aymara and Quechua groups take decisions in collective 
consensus.  
 
[2] Contradictory or Incomplete Participatory Mechanisms  
 
In Copper Mesa v Ecuador,103 geological tests in the North-western area of Ecuador 
confirmed a large number of copper resources as well as the potential impact on mining. In 
response, a number of local communities expressed their concerns and resistance to any 
potential mining activity.104 Despite initial concerns from the technical reports and the local 
community, Ecuador decided to initially grant a concession to an Ecuadorian investor, which 
eventually was acquired by Copper Mesa. Copper Mesa, initiated a number of geological 
assessments, including an environmental impact study (EIS) as well as purchased land in the 
surrounding areas of the concession.105 In addition, the investor committed resources for 
social and community development. Nonetheless, three years after, the Ecuadorian 
Government terminated concessions explaining that mineral substances were now to be 
exploited according to national interests. Concessions’ terminations were made without any 
economic compensation. In the particular context of Copper Mesa, the Secretary of Mines 
ordered termination of the mining projects due to lack of consultation with the local 
communities.106 
 
Copper Mesa alleged breach of Canada-Ecuador BIT, in respect of their three mining 
concessions. The social conflict was based on allegations of illegal land acquisition and land 
trafficking, where individuals allegedly acquired community land to resell to the company.107 
The government documented environmental and climate assessments which highlighted the 
need for relocating over 140 families. In the arbitration file, there is evidence that the 
communities got divided into different pro-mining and anti-mining groups and protests led to 
clashes and acts of violence.108 The Tribunal found that the Claimant’s personnel responded 
with acts of violence to suppress the communities, which worsened the situation.109 There is 
also evidence that local communities suffered violations in the aim of protecting their 
communities and priorities.110 Ecuador challenged the Claimant’s position by arguing that 
Copper Mesa was not appearing in the arbitration process with clean hands and that there 
were several human rights violations. Nonetheless, the Tribunal mentioned that the human 
rights arguments made by Ecuador were issues of admissibility, rather than anything that 
could have been resolved at a subsequent stage of the arbitration process. The Tribunal 
 
103 Copper Mesa v Ecuador (PCA Case No. 2012-2)Award (15 Mar. 2016). 
104 Investment Treaty News, Ecuador ordered by PCA tribunal to pay $24 million to Canadian mining company, 
https://cf.iisd.net/itn/2016/12/12/ecuador-ordered-by-pca-tribunal-to-pay-24-million-to-canadian-mining-company-copper-
mesa-mining-corporation-v-republic-of-ecuador-pca-2012-2/, accessed 26 August 2020.  
105 Copper Mesa v Ecuador, supra n. 103. 
106 Investment Treaty News, supra n. 104.  
107 Ibid at paras 1.96, 1.97, 4.158 and 5.29. 
108 Ibid at paras 4.12, 4.95 and 4.297. 
109 Ibid at para. 6.99. 
110 Columbia Centre on Sustainable Investment, Impacts of the International Investment Regime on Access to Justice, 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/CCSI_UNWGBHR_InternationalInvestmentRegime.pdf (accessed 26 
August 2020).   
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awarded about USD 19.4 million in favour of the Claimant, as compensation for 
expropriation of two of the mineral concessions.  
 
In Copper Mesa v Ecuador, there seems to be contradictory evidence regarding the 
consultation process and the extent to which the communities’ concerns were followed 
through. Therefore, most of the evidence points out to the manipulation rung of Arnstein’s 
ladder. Manipulation is found when the investor behaved in a hostile manner, as the purpose 
of the geographical and environmental studies was only an information-gathering exercise 
with no objective of engaging or addressing communities’ concerns on home relocation. The 
most relevant aspect to notice in this case is that the actions of manipulation and human rights 
violations were given a light-weight value in the arbitration decision-making process, 
evidencing limited access to justice for local communities under the international investment 
regime. Consequently, local communities affected by an investment project faced barriers in 
taking their priorities forward, and with no access to effective remedies - no liability to the 
investor- despite the sound evidence presented to the tribunal. 
 
[3] Denial of Justice or Absence of Legal Venue  
 
In the case of Pac Rim v Salvador,111 the Claimant challenged a decision denying request for 
an environmental permit and mining, only after the investor had allegedly invested millions 
of dollars at the exploration phase.112 The Claimant argued that it had invested in the mining 
exploration and provision of social amenities in the host communities, based on the promises 
made by the government to induce investments.113 On the other hand, the State contended 
that the Claimant did not meet the requirements of the existing law  and was only lobbying 
for a more favourable legal regime.114 The State argued that there is no obligation under the 
international law, to change the domestic law for the sake of a foreign investor.115 The 
Tribunal dismissed the Claimant’s claims and decided not to consider the amicus curiae brief 
because the third party was not allowed access to the vital documents and the oral hearing.116  
 
It is important to note that Pac Rim v Salvador did not involve agitation or protests, the 
notable point is that the host community sought to participate in the arbitration process, but it 
was denied access to public participation. The refusal of local communities to participate in 
the arbitration process reflects the lack of effectiveness in treaty design to address the barriers 
for a legitimate exchange of power between the investor, government and affected 
communities. Looking into the Arnstein’s ladder, it is important to notice that in this case the 
power exchange was between the two power holders (i.e. investor and State) and there is no 
genuine engagement with the communities as a right holder.  
 
In the case of Urbaser v Argentina, the investment was for a concession on public water and 
sewage.117 This case introduced a new dimension by which the State filed a counterclaim 
seeking relief and compensation for alleged breach of human rights of its citizens. Initially, 
the investor commenced arbitration to challenge measures taken by Argentina, including 
fiscal and financial regulatory changes which led to the termination of the concession. The 
investor argued that the measures constituted a breach of fair and equitable treatment 
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standard, expropriation and other protections under the Argentina-Spain BIT.118 The State 
argued that the measures were justifiable in view of the financial crisis, where the investor 
failed to make an investment which would have improved access to public water; amounting  
to a breach of the citizen’s human rights.119 The Tribunal dismissed the counterclaim and 
held that while the State’s counterclaim was premised on the investor’s failure to invest, the 
State agencies were responsible for the delay and inconsistencies that ultimately led to 
deprivation of access to water. The Tribunal also found that the State was in breach of fair 
and equitable treatment, but it refused to award compensation to the investor, on the grounds 
that the investor also failed to make necessary investment for the project.120 
 
There are noteworthy conclusions drawn by the Tribunal which opened up the opportunity to 
further elaborate the extent to which investors are obliged to respect communities’ concerns 
when undertaking an investment project.  First, the Tribunal noted that the investment treaty 
is not a closed system and as such, corporations are subjects of international law and they 
bear obligations.121Among other instruments, the Tribunal made reference to the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to establish that there were human rights obligations 
associated with a right to water. Therefore, the approach taken by the Tribunal reflects 
acceptance of the investor’s obligations to engage into a meaningful relationship with the 
local communities which makes the investor accountable for social and environmental 
obligations attached to the investment project. This approach also serves to identify the need 
for further clarity in the content of investment treaties as there is currently very limited 
guidance on the scope of community rights that should be respected during the life of an 
investment project.   
[E] Social License to Operate as a Medium for Public Participation  
 
The debate about obtaining and maintaining a certain level of social acceptance in the 
investment project is crystalized in the notion of SLO, which appeared in detail for the first 
time in the case of Beer Creek v Peru.122 This case involved a mining project in Santa Ana.123 
Under Peruvian Constitutional law, the investor required the  Peruvian Government to make a 
‘Declaration of Necessity’ so that the investor could acquire mining concessions in the 
region.124 The investor first acquired a mining concession through a Peruvian national and 
just  after the Government issued a declaration of necessity, Bear Creek took over the 
concession agreement.125 The investor sought to consult the host community and engaged it 
in the discussion regarding the impacts and benefits of the project. However, NGOs stated 
that the consultations were not effective, due to language barrier, insufficient opportunity for 
public participation and lack of transparency on the investor’s approach.126 The NGO 
declaration was followed by violent opposition and agitations against the project by the host 
community, which led to food shortage, poor sanitation and physical injuries.127 The 
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Government reacted by revoking the declaration of public necessity, thereby rendering the 
mining concessions ineffective.128 In the  arbitration process, the Tribunal found that the 
Claimant’s approach to community engagement was defective, but noted that these were 
initially approved by the State.129 The Tribunal therefore held that the State was liable for 
indirect expropriation and it awarded compensation to the Claimant, accordingly.130 
 
[1] Legal Nature 
 
Beer Creek v Peru raises different issues regarding communities’ rights and public 
participation, including questions on the legal nature of SLO, who is obliged to apply for it 
and under which legal framework SLO should be established. On the question of legal nature, 
it has been argued that SLO does not really have a legal footing but it relies on extra-legal 
and social norms.131 From a policy perspective,  the UN SDG 16.7 target shows broad and 
universal acceptance of concepts like SLO and therefore it provides to the international 
investment law regime an opportunity to pay closer attention to the rights of the host 
communities. In the particular case of Beer Creek v Peru, the Claimant argued that SLO is 
not part of the domestic law nor part of international law; while Peru contended that the legal 
duty to obtain SLO is a well-accepted obligation under the international law.132 At this 
juncture, it is important to note that there are other notions which perhaps might be more 
familiar to investors and arbitration tribunals, including Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR), social impacts assessment, legitimacy, stakeholder engagement and energy justice, 
among other things.133  
 
[2] Obligation to Obtain and Maintain SLO and Applicable Legal Framework  
 
On the question of which party has an obligation to obtain SLO, a dissenting opinion in Bear 
Creek v Peru argues that investors also have obligations to obtain and maintain the social 
approval from the community in accordance with international investment law.134  It has also 
been noted that in the context of investment law, it is possible that SLO can be used 
instinctively from FPIC by placing the obligation of public participation on the host- state of 
the investments rather than the investor.135 In Beer Creek v Peru, the tribunal confirmed that 
the investor had an obligation to obtain SLO and that the steps taken by the investor were 
inadequate. Nonetheless, the Tribunal held that the State was responsible for approving the 
investor’s steps and the failure to raise objections or queries.136 The Tribunal also held that in 
the circumstances, the investor was entitled to assume that its activities of consulting the 
communities were sufficiently compliant with the legal requirements.137 Therefore, an 
effective implementation of SLO into the investment treaty regime would require a legal 
triangulation between state-investor-community. This triangulation would create the States’ 
obligation to review the steps taken by the investors and raise queries where the approach of 
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an investor is ineffective, before the relationship with the host communities degenerates to 
complete mistrust. It will also help to ensure that the State insists on the standard of 
protection provided in the existing laws for the vulnerable groups.  
 
For example, the case of Alvarez y Marin Corporation SA and others v. Republic of 
Panama138 involved a direct conflict of property ownership rights, between the investor and 
indigenous people and it shows the need for the administrative implementation of statutory 
protections for indigenous groups. It was a claim that the indigenous people invaded the 
investor’s property.139 The claimant was the sole shareholder of a real estate company which 
invested in a tourism project and acquired 685 hectares of land for the project.140 The 
Panamanian land authority issued an administrative decision that a large part of the investor’s 
project land fell within the indigenous people’s protected area.141 The investor challenged the 
decision, arguing that it contradicts an earlier judicial decision and it is inconsistent with the 
right of the investor under international law.142 The investor alleged that the administrative 
decision led to severe opposition by the indigenous people and it effectively frustrated the 
project.143 However, the Tribunal declined jurisdiction and granted the preliminary objection 
filed by the State.144 The Tribunal found that the investment was tainted with substantial 
illegality, involving breach of the statutory provisions that protect the indigenous land area.145 
The Tribunal also found that the judicial decision relied upon by the investor was tainted by 
fraudulent witness statements and substantial irregularities, in breach of the law.146 Even 
though the legality requirement is not expressly provided for in the applicable investment 
treaties, the Tribunal found that it is a requirement of general international law.147 Effectively, 
the Tribunal found support for the administrative decision in the reasoning that an investor 
cannot ignore statutory provisions in the domestic law to exercise his rights of protection 
under the international investment law. 
 
[F] Institutional Initiatives on Transparency and Public Participation  
In consistency with the requirements of public participation envisaged by the SDGs, 
arbitration institutions have been paying attention to public participation, transparency and 
matters of public interest. For example, the 2013 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency provide 
for the publication of documents filed in the proceedings and decisions made by tribunals,148 
subject to the exception of protecting confidential information.149 These rules also make 
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provisions for the participation of third parties, which may have significant interests in the 
proceedings and can file written submissions into the arbitration process.150  
The ICC Commission on Climate Change observed further that transparency concerns are 
also gaining more traction in commercial arbitration cases involving state enterprises.151 On 
climate change-related disputes, the Commission predicted that the transparency concerns 
would be more significant due to public interests involved in climate change.152 It therefore 
recommended that proceedings in climate change-related cases should be open to the public 
and decisions also published.153 More importantly, the ICC Task Force recognised that there 
are potential disputes arising from energy and natural resources projects, which can involve 
impacted groups or populations who are not party to the arbitration agreement. A procedural 
solution, the ICC presents, is the possibility of including a unilateral offer to arbitrate in the 
form of a possible future submission agreement. A submission agreement in place for a local 
group or population impacted by the establishment of an energy project can prevent multiple, 
multi-jurisdictional and court proceedings with inconsistent outcomes.154  
Earlier in 2001, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) had published PCA Optional 
Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment. It 
provides for an optional list of arbitrators and experts, in the field of natural resources and 
environmental law.155 The rules empower the tribunal to conduct the proceedings in the 
manner it sees fit, provided that parties are provided full and equal opportunities.156 It also 
enables the tribunal to consider the merit of an application by either party to classify 
information or documents as confidential.157 This indirectly leaned towards transparency 
since information and documents are not to be automatically regarded as confidential, unless 
the tribunal classifies them after a careful consideration of the application of either party.158 It 
shows an indication with respect to which the ICC Commission observed that it is possible to 
make some parts of the proceedings public, while maintaining confidentiality where 
disclosure will cause serious harm to a party or the parties.159 The PCA optional arbitration 
rule provides that the tribunal can appoint a confidentiality adviser to manage the confidential 
aspect of the information and report to the tribunal.160  
[G] Proposal: Constitutional Source as a Drive of Investment Interests and Effective 
Procedures  
Using the Arnstein’s ladder to measure the level of public participation in international 
investment law, through cases, there is evidence of fluctuations running through the different 
rungs of the ladder. There are some common trends existing in the indications shown in the 
different cases and among the reasoning of the tribunals. For example, both Gold Reserve v 
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Venezuela and Quiborax v Bolivia show placation while Clayton v Canada and Glamis Gold 
v USA both show how a case may interact with two or more rungs of the ladder. A common 
trend concerning the reasoning of the tribunals in the cases is the indication of lack of 
sufficient basis to grant procedural access to the communities for participation in decision-
making. The approach of the tribunals in the cases of Glamis Gold v USA and Pac Rim v 
Salvador, for example, show the evidence of lack of access to effective. There is also a lack 
of sufficient opportunity for the protection of the substantive rights of the communities, since 
the States are yet to provide clarity in the law, even at domestic levels.  
 
From the survey of investment treaty cases conducted in this paper, it is possible to identify 
the necessary elements to create a normative proposal to effectively formalize public 
participation in international investment law. First, looking into the analysis of the behaviour 
taken by states as respondents, it seems that the most important key source to take action on 
protecting community rights is a constitutional mandate or legislative framework. This means 
that states, in principle, need to be motivated by national interests which are recognized in the 
law, including: ecology, biodiversity and the protection of communities’ rights, including 
vulnerable groups of the nation, such as indigenous groups. This also implies that when states 
have positivised a protected value in their laws, it is more likely that they would ensure this 
same principle is followed in the performance of international investments. Moreover, a 
strong legislative mandate places the state hosting the investment in a duty of protecting the 
public order, which is monitored by public pressure and opposition if this duty is not 
followed.  
 
Having identified the key elements of public participation at domestic level, the next question 
that arises is how these constitutional values and public duty can be transposed to 
international investment law? A preliminary suggestion is that states would work more 
effectively if certain instruments that are recognised at national level, also form part of the 
content of investment agreements. For example, when states have procedural clarity at 
domestic level, on mechanisms such as a joint review panel, it is more likely that these 
processes are timely followed at the pre-investment stage. Most importantly, it seems 
advisable that investment agreements make explicit reference to those national interests but 
also the preferable mechanism to enforce public participation. In contrast, when certain 
notions are not duly recognised as a matter of national interest and there is lack of clarity on 
the adequate methods to enforce those priorities; it is ineffective to place that burden on 




While there are different possible notions that can encapsulate public participation rights; 
there are already salient characteristics that should be contemplated, these include:  
 
1. Definition, scope and requirements of representation in order to be considered an 
affected community   
2. System of notification to the affected communities 
3. Number and format of consultations and expected outcomes  
4. Standards for consensus  
5. Feedback exchange between communities and foreign investor  
6. Actions to be taken in order to give effective enforcement to the concerns and 
priorities identified in the consultations  
7. Principles to avoid one-way communications  
8. Assessment of the actions taken to follow through concerns 
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9. Possibility of economic compensation as a trade-off in exchange of investment 
performance  
10. Sanctions, including warning and conditions to reframe the investment project 
11. Withdrawal of investment permit in cases where the process failed to deliver the 
expected outcomes 
[H] Conclusion  
 
It has been shown that a paradigm shift has begun on the inclusion of the host communities’ 
rights in the dynamics of the international investment law. As evidence of the beginning of 
the paradigm shift, reference has been made to some investment arbitration cases and new 
investment treaties such as the Canada-EU Free Trade Agreement and the Netherlands Model 
Investment Agreement. With the main focus on Latin America, this Chapter has used the 
Arnstein’s ladder to measure and classify public participation and host community 
engagement in investment projects, as shown in arbitration cases that are publicly available. 
The level of involvement and engagement of the host communities varies in different 
instances leading to the disputes presented to the arbitration tribunals. At the minimum, there 
are cases in which the investor and the government merely sought to educate the host 
communities without conceding any power to the host communities in the process of 
decision-making. In some cases, a certain level of power is conceded to the communities and 
they are more involved in the decision-making processes. At the top of the Arnstein’s ladder 
is a situation where the host communities have managerial or decision-making control, 
including the power to veto the investment project. Furthermore, the reasoning of the 
tribunals in the cases considered also shows some common trends. The most notable among 
the common trends are the indications of the absence of clarity in the law and the lack of 
access to proceedings by the communities that wish to articulate their concerns. This leads to 
lack of opportunities to moderate a balance of powers in the growing triangulation among the 
States, the investors and the host communities. This Chapter has also considered the use of 
the concept of SLO to achieve the requirements of the SDG on public participation in 
decision-making. It is submitted that the need for the inclusion of the rights of the host 
communities and the indigenous groups alters the binary approach to the international 
investment law, as it leads to a triangulation among the states, the investors and the host 
communities. The triangulation fully aligns with the SDG’s requirement for public 
participation and it helps to enhance the public legitimacy of the ISDS. It is expected that the 
trend will grow gradually. However, it is submitted that it is better that the reform is premised 
on a solution which is firmly rooted in the constitutional values and legislative frameworks at 
the domestic level, as the foundation. Investment agreements then need to make references to 
the constitutional values and legislative frameworks as matters of national interests. While 
investment agreements need to pay attention to the values of the host communities and rights 
of public participation, there is a limit to how much details can be contained in such 
agreements. Also, provisions in domestic constitutions and laws call for more accountability 
on the part of the States and the approach has the potential to address the relevant issues at 
pre-investment stages.  
 
 
